Skip to main content

Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

See other formats

was acknowledged as a c friend 3 of Moscow., while her Government was
regarded as its * enemy/ Where possible in any country in Europe, the
Soviets, in pursuance of their designs and to attain their goal, had begun
a subversive movement independent of the policy of the United Nations
and working through the Communist parties. Attempts to create bases
for the future development of Civil War and the subsequent establishment
of the Soviet system, were made, not only in Poland, but in Yugoslavia,
Greece, France., Belgium and Norway. Moscow was holding up her

* Underground Movements ' in Europe as the only national movements
representing the respective peoples, thus, to quote one instance only
the c Free Yugoslav * station broadcasting from Tim's was (according to
them) representing Yugoslavia, the ' Free Norway 5 station from Moscow
ŚNorway, and so on.

It was impossible to reconcile all this with the official policy proclaimed
by the Soviets in their new national slogans and in their signature, despite
restrictions, of the Atlantic Charter or with their subsequent dissolution
of the Comintern. This succession of commitments and contradictory
moves was a natural sequence of events for the Soviet Communist, who
saw in it only the play which should finally produce the desired result.
It was in complete accordance with orthodox Communist ideology,
which had, at that time, an official and authoritative interpreter in the
person of Stalin, so authoritative indeed that those in the Soviet Union
who were not of the same mind had left this world years ago.

The thoughts spoken by Stalin on the past twenty-five years, on the
order ruling in Russia and her ultimate role in the future of the world,
gives the observer the chance of realising how little the essential character
of Soviet belief had changed during this time. Lenin was the theorist,
the creator of a certain philosophical system of community life. He had
eliminated the possibility of a Romanov dynasty and a capitalist restoration
by mass execution. He had wiped out all vestiges of Western law, and
then returned to the Mongol conception of state organisation. Stalin's
ambition was not only to interpret and widen the scope of Lenin's world,
but even to create his own. In Moscow they differentiated between

* Leninism' andc Stalinism ' as between two systems of political thought,
but in fact, when under the heavy pressure of war c Stalinism 9 had come
into contact with reality^ it proved to be merely an unvarnished version
of Tsardom in its purest form, vividly recalling the epoch of Ivan the
Terrible and Peter the Great.   In the realms of foreign policy, it meant
the most primitive expansion by use of armed force.   And to achieve this
ambition, Stalin had already transformed Russia once again into a huge
war-machine.    Since this dictator was the soul of that gigantic enterprise,
it would be more exact to present the Russian foreign policy, which is the
direct outcome of this enterprise, rather through Stalin's words than by
the formulae of his late master.